Rights of the Police, the Judiciary, and the Executive

Права Полиции, Судебной Власти и Исполнительной Власти
"So you know, when you see me swangin' nigga..
Handlin' my business, mindin' my own business
Stay the fuck out my way nigga!"

— Young Buck –Fuck Tha Police
सीधा जेल जाएगा
कोई बात नही
एह बड़ी मार खाएगा
कोई बात नही
क्या याद करेगा
जा तुझे छोड़ दिया
पहली बार माफ़ किया
नही बाबा नही

— Anand Bakshi –Ja Jaldi Bhaag Ja
Do the police have any rights? Does the judiciary have any rights? Does the executive have any rights? The answer is no. They do not have any rights. Rights are available only to citizens, or to be more accurate, to the people. The police, the judiciary, the executive –they have got powers and nothing more.

These powers flow from rules, laws, constitutional provisions, even from custom in many instances. They are limited by either the same or different rules, laws, constitutional provisions, and customs.

Powers are onerous things. Loss of power is all too often accompanied by loss of face. Another quality of powers is that they are always illusory. Powers of those who rule remain powers, they never become rights. There is a relationship of direct proportionality between power and responsibility ("with great power comes great responsibility").

In ideal cases powers are strictly defined. In less ideal cases they are less strictly defined. In ideal cases every reported instance of abuse of power leads to prosecution. In less ideal cases officials, officers, and office holders who abuse power are sometimes (or more than sometimes) able to get away with such abuse even if it is reported.

Before we go further, let us note that the fact that powers are not rights is not only (a) very important to note, but that it is (b) applicable to all countries and not just to India.

It may be the case in some countries a, b, c, x, y, z etc. that misuse of powers is the usual case while observance of rules which govern use of powers is (or becomes (as the case may be)) the exception.

Some of these countries (say a, b, and c), it is equally possible, could *broadly speaking* be on the path of growth of individual liberties, i.e. they could have histories of mass oppression with no known historical period during which those in power respected or even recognised the rights of those whom they governed. Such historical periods in such countries are followed by a phase when rights of man and citizen start to get codified. This phase is invariably recognised as the phase of the founding fathers (or founding parents, as the case may be) of such specific countries. The third logical phase (in this logical sequence) is the phase mentioned in the preceding paragraph, i.e. a historical phase during which "misuse of powers is the usual case while observance of rules which govern use of powers is the exception".

We are probably justified in assuming that the last mentioned phase (in countries a, b, and c) is followed by yet another logical historical phase in which observance of rules which govern use of powers becomes the norm and misuse of powers becomes the rare case, i.e. the exception.

Why are we (probably) justified in assuming the above? We are (probably) justified in assuming so because we have already assumed that this set of countries is broadly speaking on the path of growth of individual liberties.

Why are we probably justified, and not definitely justified (in assuming the above)? We will answer this question, but before we get to the answer, let us discuss the case of the remaining countries, namely x, y, and z.

The remaining countries in the above list, i.e. x, y, and z are (in the present sequence of assumptions) countries which *broadly speaking* are on the path of decay of individual liberties. All these countries without exception are (in our imaginations) known to have experienced golden (or almost golden) historical periods when there was great stability in society which (stability) stemmed from great respect for individual liberties.

Note that even in countries which have had golden (or almost golden) historical periods, such historical golden periods must needs have been preceded by phases when rights of man and citizen started to get codified. Further, there is a third logical phase when the golden historical period starts to decline. In this stage observance of rules is still the norm, but less so than in the golden period.

But here we are discussing neither the periods when rights of man and citizen started to get codified (in x, y, and z), nor their golden historical periods, nor indeed the early stage of decay. We are discussing historical periods in which "misuse of powers is the usual case while observance of rules which govern use of powers becomes the exception" (see above).

What leads to the historical shift from an almost golden period in the life of a country to a period when misuse of powers becomes the usual case? We need to answer a different question before we answer this one. That question is, wait for it, "What leads to "great respect for individual liberties" (or almost great respect for individual liberties)?" The short answer is **fear of punishment**. The more correct and more complete answer is that **that fear of punishment** which is experienced by those officials, officers, and office holders who are likely to contemplate abuse of powers is what leads to respect for individual liberties.

Now onward to the second out of two questions which we postponed answering, namely "What leads to the historical shift from an almost golden period in the life of a country to a period when misuse of powers becomes the usual case?". This is a 64 dollar question if a 64 dollar question ever existed. As far as this writer is able to tell from his modest experience, external interference or internal factors or a combination thereof lead to erosion of **that fear** (of punishment) which is experienced by those officials, officers, and office holders who are likely to abuse their powers. This erosion of **that fear** leads to the said historical shift.

And now we will (try to) answer the first question (out of two) which we postponed answering, which is "Why are we probably justified, and not definitely justified (in assuming the above)?" The first part of the answer is that we were only *broadly speaking*. The second and more important part is that the reason why we were *broadly speaking* is that we do not know what path that **fear of punishment**, that priceless **fear of punishment** will take in each individual country.

We can get along if my rights end where your rights begin. But if my rights end where your powers begin then you are treading a dangerous path.




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Published by Manish Udar

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last updated on 08th May 2022
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